Untitled Essay Research Paper Question Can scepticism — страница 3

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Justification of Arguments from Experience From one’s experience or observations, current and past, one can inductively infer what will happen in the near future and where certain things exist. Therefore one can say that in the cupboard my coat is hanging and that I shall have a sandwich for lunch. David Hume however argued that I cannot know that my coat is in the cupboard unless I have justification in believing that my experience makes my proposition probable (Dancy, 1985, p.15). This again draws on my knowledge of the consistency of the outside world but it also needs me to believe that events that I have not observed are similar to those I have observed and Hume’s point is that I have no reason to believe this. The sceptical side of this therefore is that one cannot make

assumptions regarding one’s senses which are unreliable in the first place. The experiences one has had cannot lead to assumptions beyond one’s experiences. The epistemist’s response to this would be to then ask the sceptic but where would we be if we could not believe the unobserved events to be happening. The reasonable belief of these events flows from the consistency of the outside world. If we could not believe in this consistency sitting down would even cause problems due to the fact that the chair would at some point become an unobserved experience. The fact of the matter is that we would not be able to survive for very long if we could not trust in our previous experience. 8. The Epistemist Rejoin for all Arguments This is the reply that any epistemist can make to a

sceptic with a guaranteed outcome. The epistemist really just needs to say that since the sceptics argue that there is no knowledge only reasonable belief then reasonable belief is the most they can have of their propositions and conclusions. This is another example of the reflexive argument being turned on scepticism. 9. Conclusion Judging by the above arguments, which are admittedly not of the strongest sceptical type as they are all global arguments and do not attack our notion of understanding, scepticism can be defended. The onus of proof of the fact that knowledge exists lies with the epistemist and viewing the above arguments. The sceptic should concede that reasonable belief can exist but should vehemently argue that true knowledge cannot exist even though reasonable

belief or justification exists. The part of the knowledge criteria that causes the problem is the truth criterion and this criterion can never totally be fulfilled.Bibliography Ayer, A. J. (1965), Philosophical Essays, London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd. Ayer, A. J. (1980), Hume, London: Oxford University Press. Cornman, Lehrer, Pappas (1992), Philosophical Problems and Arguments – An Introduction , Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. Coval, S. (1967), Scepticism and the First Person, Great Britain: Methuen & Co. Ltd. Dancy, Jonathon (1985), An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Great Britain: Basil Blackwell Ltd. Descartes, Rene (as translated by E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross) (1969), The Philosophical Works of Decartes vol. I – II, Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press. Edwards, Paul (1965), The Logic of Moral Discourse, New York: The Free Press. Gorovitz, Williams (1967), Philosophical Analysis, An Introduction to Its Language & Techniques, New York: Random House. Guthrie, W. K. C. (1971), The Sophists, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hamlyn, D. W. (1983), The Theory of Knowledge, London: Macmillan Press. Harris, Errol (1969), Fundamentals of Philosophy – A Study of Classical Texts, U.S.A.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. Harrison, J. (1966-67). A Philosopher’s Nightmare or The Ghost not Laid. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol LXVII. Hume, David (1962), A Treatise of Human Nature, Great Britain: Fontana Library. Presley, C. F. (1967), The Identity Theory of Mind, St Lucia: University of Queensland

Press. van Inwagen, P. and Lowe E. (1996) . Why Is There Anything At All?. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol LXX.