To What Extent Can Beitz — страница 3

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did not take place.? (Beitz1979b:131) However, Beitz?s stance on interdependence is met with significant criticism. Chris Brown, for example, notes that levels of mutuality between rich and poor states are very low indeed. Poor states generally depend far more on the richer ones than vice-versa. Beitz?s position can seem rather contradictory. For example, he claims that his primary consideration is that a global difference principle need not be applied in the present (an existence condition) but it may be applied in the future (a feasibility condition). ?It was in this sense that ideal theory was made immune from empirical arguments about the nature of the non-ideal world at present.?(Pin-Fat1997:203)) This position is contradictory since Beitz?s interdependence argument is one

built on the condition of existence in the present. Beitz believes that if anything, global principles of justice should be applied in the present since conditions of interdependence produce a cooperative scheme. However, we can question this logic since Beitz is of the opinion that the many and varied features of the non-ideal world cannot negate the applicability of global principles of justice. Beitz continues by suggesting that these principles of justice should be applied in the present because a condition of interdependence pertains. Thus it seems to be the case that Beitz has mixed ideal theory with observations about the non-ideal world. Principles of justice are intended to be the outcome of a reflectively rational choice within a global original position and decisions

not including those founded on empirical ?fact?. This is precisely what separates ideal theory from the non-ideal world- ?without such a demarcation, there would be no need for postulating a global original position within which to choose principles of international distributive justice?(Beitz 1979b:155). ?There is no doubt that the main difference between international relations and domestic society is the absence in the former case of effective decision making institutions?(Beitz1979b). In contrast to Hobbes? analogy that the international realm could be linked to the state of nature, Beitz argues that this distinguishing feature is false. Nevertheless, he maintains that for the sole purpose of proving his theory concerning the application of international distributive justice,

the distinction will remain true. He draws on the examples set by NATO and the European Union as sufficient evidence of a ?high degree of voluntary compliance with customary norms and institutionalized rules established by agreement.?(Beitz1979b:47) Thus we can see the emergence of a point of view that refutes the Hobbesian assumption linking international relations with a state of anarchy. Towards the end of Political Theory, Beitz states that anarchy is a distinguishing feature of the international. We begin to notice another contradiction in Beitz?s theory regarding the international contrasted to that of the domestic. He states ?one cannot plausibly argue that these are similar in extent to those characteristics of most domestic societies.? (Beitz1979b: 155) This is a major

fault in the Beitz theory. One may argue in defense of Beitz that such a contradiction was made because Beitz is refuting the possibility of a resemblance between international relations and a ?state of nature?. However, this defense seems to be foundationally weak. For example, most Realists regard the international to be associated with the state of nature. Also, we may add that Beitz does not maintain the assumption (grammatically) of anarchy in a Realist form. Beitz?s grammar constitutes the problem of international ethics as one of realization. The problem of international ethics as one of ?realization? occurs namely because of the separation of ideal theory from the non-ideal world. International ethics becomes a problem when transferring it from a hypothetical state to a

practical one. In short, therefore, ethical problems of realization become directly related to the primary characteristics of the non-ideal world. For example, the lack of a supra-national governing body would mean that there is no institution to ensure the equal distribution of resources. Also, it means that international institutions have no effective method of dealing with what are known as ?free-riders?- members who will avoid contributing equal to other members. We may also add that Rawls? theory of justice is a contract theory. This theory makes assumptions about the nature of the social relations between people. Regarding the problem of realization, Beitz does not completely distinguish himself from the Realists. Between the two, differences only surface regarding the