The Suez Crisis Essay Research Paper Carleton — страница 4

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discussing why Israel would invade in the War, Herzog simply stated that the events of the years since the 1949 armistice along with Nasser’s rhetoric led the Israeli government to the logical decision that a defensive strike had to be launched in order to save the nation. Riad, on the same topic, calmly wrote that it was part of Israel’s plan to reach out and envelop more territory into their grasp- practically an imperial move. One has to take into account, with the authors that I have studied, that they are very biased on one side of the debate or the other- many were involved directly with the governments at the time of the crisis and thus must support the policies which perhaps they helped form. I would have to admit that the interpretations I found most believable were

probably found in Western (British) historical accounts of the crisis- the book by Lucas seemed most willing to spread around blame for the debacle of 1956, especially on the door of 10 Downing Street itself. The Jewish and Arab authors did not display this strength of character for the most part, however a few exceptions can be noted. An Egyptian example is found in the book by Fahmy, who readily admitted that it was not any feat by Nasser or his army that gave a victory of sorts to his country- it was the workers of the Suez Canal who in the years following the crisis showed the world that they could successfully and profitably run the waterway without European help or control. I believe that the writers from this turbulent region were under considerably more stress to support

their country’s record in the crisis than a Western author may have been in a comparable account, and this I did take into consideration in completing my assignment. The Crisis of 1956 does not figure that prominently in either Jewish or Arab texts or writings on the time since 1945- perhaps it was overshadowed by the 1948, 1967 and 1973 Wars- or perhaps it was the European involvement that takes away from it being another true chapter in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whatever the interpretation, this was indeed an significant event both in the history of this region, and for the world, and it seems as if more time is needed before we can truly begin to examine it from a neutral perspective. Annotated Bibliography As stated in my paper, I decided upon commencing my task to seek

out the most biased of authors from both sides in the Arab-Israeli debate, which provided reference to the 1956 Suez Crisis. This was for the most part the norm for this essay, with the exception of the one more European text I used to offer me a sense of how the crisis was handled from the Western side. For this I used W. Scott Lucas’ “Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis” (1991). While Lucas wrote mainly from the British perspective, his text was helpful to me in gaining a general understanding of how the crisis was played out through a series of carefully broken down events. Having thus gained a rudimentary understanding of the crisis, I then sought out some biased sources from both sides of the Suez. After looking in vain for articles on the topic, I

found that my best bet lied in the combination of memoirs of noted politicians of the time from the region, and from the writings of a few noted academics, both Egyptian and Israeli. For Arab sources, I began by going to the source, using the memoirs of both Anwar el-Sadat, the person who followed Nasser as President of Egypt in 1967, in his book “In Search of Identity” (1977). I also used the works of another couple of famous Egyptian politicians, in “The Struggle for Peace in the Middle East” by Mahmouud Riad, and “Negotiating for Peace in the Middle East”, by Ismail Fahmy. Both Riad, who served as an international diplomat under Nasser, and Fahmy, who was Sadat’s Foreign Minister for so many years, had vivid and detailed memories of the crisis. Add to this list

the book by the famous Arab military man Anouar Abdel-Malak’s “Egypt: Military Society” (1968), a book that helped give me a better idea of how the Egyptian army forces viewed and dealt with the crisis. Finally, the jewish authors I sought out were from an equally varied number of sources, again using politicans, military men and academics. To help in a general rounding of the Israeli view of the crisis, I used Yitzak Shamir’s autobiography (Shamir, Yitzhak; “Summing Up”; London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson Press; 1994.), a man who was to play an integral role in the Arab-Israeli conflict as the Prime Minister of Israel in the 1980s. My search for an Israeli military perspective was quite arduous, but finally settled on the work of Chaim Herzog in “The Arab-Israeli