The Pressures Of Patco Strikes And Stress — страница 10

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about the grievances made by air traffic controllers before, during, and after the walkout, is the dramatic language they used to express their concerns. In 1981 congressional hearings, Poli responded to an attack on the legitimacy of PATCO’s demands by saying that controllers “are not starving, but they are starving for a working condition that does not leave them destroyed individuals when they leave the job after 14, 15, 16 years.” Dennis Lebeau, striking after twelve years as an ATC, simply said, “it’s our lives at stake and they’re worth the sacrifice.” The wife of a 28-year old traffic controller in Chicago explained that the strike was not simply a matter of principle but a “matter of survival.” In 1984 a striker wrote that “given the same set of

circumstances at any given time, I would do it again. There is no doubt history will prove PATCO was right in their actions. Maybe legally wrong, but surely morally right.” 34 A placard carried during the strike read: “We’re on strike against (F)ear, (A)ntagonism, and (A)dversary.”Consistent use of such passionate, suggestive terms indicates a deeply rooted frustration with FAA management. These men (almost all the controllers were men) were not suffering from economic deprivation or a lack of respect. They loved their jobs. One controller’s wife explained that ” . . . they were like gods . . . they were like giants; they were like nobody else; . . . macho, crazy, eager, proud, dedicated.”35 These very conditions may have contributed to many controllers’ decision

to strike, as did an almost universal confidence that they were vital to the functioning of the system. These factors may also have embedded the firm conviction that they were entitled to the power to enact changes in the workplace which they believed would better their own lives and enhance the safety of the system. The irony, of course, is that theoretically the FAA had the same goals (operating under the assumption with which most agreed that a happier workforce would enhance safety, while dispirited and overworked ATCs would harm the system’s effectiveness). Yet in the eyes of controllers, the FAA’s dictatorial character undercut both goals to an intolerable degree. Thus the feeling of morality, survival, and the need to act.36This power struggle emerged clearly in the

many congressional hearings dealing with the status of the ATC system and the government sponsored surveys of the ATC force. Controllers in both instances told again and again of the arbitrary and authoritarian nature of management that little by little eroded their ability to perform their job, their control over life away from work, and their dignity, and the stress that resulted. The FAA’s constant attempt to limit worker independence is evident, as is the controllers’ interest in gaining more autonomy.In 1979 a subcommittee of the Committee of Public Works and Transportation held hearings about the adequacy of equipment and staffing in the ATC system. Interestingly and significantly, when the committee’s staff attempted to collect information from twenty ATC centers

around the country to compare statistics on FAA equipment and procedures in preparation for the hearings, the FAA issued orders advising centers not to provide any information. In his opening statement Representative Tom Corson (IL) noted controllers’ complaints that there were “no set standards used by supervisors in deciding numbers and qualifications of people necessary to work at a given time.” 37 Corson emphasized that shortages of qualified staff, inadequately maintained and out of date equipment, insufficient training programs, safety hazards all contributed to a low morale.Less than a year later, during an investigation of computer failures in the ATC system, Representative Bob Whitakker (KS) pointed out that the official FAA response to most near misses was that

“they chose to blame the controller for the near tragedy and only listed the computer malfunction as a contributing cause.” ATC Charles Mullick from Oakland testified that “controllers are now hesitant to report dangerous or possibly dangerous situations for fear of reprisal by the FAA.” Mullick added that “the FAA has taken away our second career [the physical ability to pursue another occupation once unable to continue air traffic controlling due to its debilitating effects], our safety reporting program, and a number of freedoms guaranteed under the US Constitution.” 38 Such remarks only showed in part the conflicts and confrontations that ATCs experienced daily.Controllers saw management’s abuse of power as affecting not only job performance, but hurting the