The Good Life(Comparison Of Kant And Nietzsche) — страница 2

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appropriate than the slave morality. The crime of slave morality is that they claim universality for their moral system when in fact it is appropriate for only some kinds of humans. Nietzsche recognizes that the slave morality makes sense and is beneficial to certain types. The slave morality is the one that is appropriate for, that makes sense to, individuals that Nietzsche characterizes as “weak.” The revolt of the slaves in morals begins in the very principle of resentment becoming creative and giving birth to values. Resentment experienced by creatures that, deprived as they are of the proper outlet of action, are forced to find their compensation in an imaginary revenge. The instinct of revenge and resentment appears as a means of enduring life, as a self-preservative

measure. The hatred of egoism, whether it be one’s own or another’s, appears as a valuation reached under the predominance of revenge. “Nietzsche condemns the ideals of peace and universal equality, expositing their life-denying qualities. Exploitation and competition, he argues, characterize all living things, because they are the very essence of the will to power.” As one wishes to take this principle more generally, it would immediately disclose what it really is, a Will to the “denial of life.” The self-preservative measure of a community, forbids certain actions that have a definite tendency to jeopardize the welfare of that community. It does not forbid the attitude of the mind, which gives rise to these actions, when it is a matter of opposing the enemies.

Kant’s theories are based on one thing, the Good Will. It is the only intrinsic good, good in itself. Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will. There are even some qualities that are of service to this good will itself, and may facilitate its action, yet which have no intrinsic unconditional value, but always presuppose a good will. This qualifies the esteem that we justly have for them, and does not permit us to regard them as absolutely good. “The good will is not good because it achieves good results. Even if it were unable to attain the ends it seeks, it would still be good in itself and have a higher worth than the superficial things gained by immoral actions.” “If nature

intended humans to be happy, it would have provided an instinct to this end. What we observe is that the more people cultivate their reason, the less likely they are to find happiness. Kant concludes that reason is not intended to produce happiness but to produce a good will.” In a being that has reason and a will, if the proper object of nature were its conservation, its welfare, in a word, its happiness, then nature would have hit upon a very bad arrangement in selecting the reason of the creature to carry out this purpose. For all the actions that the creature has to perform with a view to this purpose, would be far more surely prescribed to it by instinct. That end would have been attained much more certainly than it ever can be by reason. Nature generally in the

distribution of her capacities has adapted the means to the end, its true destination must be to produce will, not merely good as a means to something else, but good in itself, for which reason was absolutely necessary. A good will is one that acts for the sake of duty. Human actions have inner moral worth only if they are performed from duty. Actions that result from inclination or self-interest may be praiseworthy if they happen, for whatever reason, to accord with duty, but they have no inner worth. “Kant warns that those who fail to understand properly the concept of duty may be tempted to act from motives that may be in accordance with duty or may be contrary to it. But even action in accordance with duty is not enough; only respect for duty gives an action inner moral

worth.” It is a duty to maintain one’s life; and in addition, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so. But on this account the often-anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their asserting has no moral import. Kant has three ethical propositions. The first is that the act must be done from duty in order to have inner moral worth. His second proposition is derived from the first that an act done from duty derives its moral value not from the results it produces but from the principle by which it is determined. The third proposition is that duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law. An action done from duty must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can