The Effects Of Concealed Handgun Laws Essay — страница 3

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property crimes to increase through a substitution effect (if criminals are not committing violent crimes, they will move on to less-risky property crimes). Using methods similar to those used for the violent crime rate data, Lott concluded that property crimes would increase by 2.7 percent. An increase of this size would have resulted in 247,000 more property crimes in 1992. As well as examining the effects of nondiscretionary laws on the rates of violent and property crimes, Lott also determined how adopting more lenient gun control laws would affect the rate of accidental deaths in states without these laws. He calculated the rate of accidental deaths from handguns would increase by 0.48 percent. Considering that there were 200 accidental gun deaths in the nation in 1988 (the

last date for which nationwide data is available), this would indicate that implementing nondiscretionary laws may increase accidental deaths by less than one. The effect of nondiscretionary laws on the number of suicides was weighed as well, but no significant evidence was found. The Effects on Social Welfare It is difficult to gauge the change of social welfare caused by implementing nondiscretionary concealed-handgun laws by simply comparing the numbers of crimes committed. It is possible, however, to assign monetary values to each crime category. This allows the gains accumulated by reducing violent crime to be weighed against the losses suffered due to the increase in the number of property crimes. The National Institute of Justice (NIJ), which is the research and

development agency of the U.S. Department of Justice, was established by Congress to prevent and reduce crime by sponsoring research projects. The NIJ examined the costs to victims of different types of crimes by measuring lost productivity, out-of-pocket expenses, and losses from fear, pain, suffering, and lost quality of life. Combining Lott s estimated reduction in crime with the National Institute of Justice s estimates results in a gain of $5.7 billion for allowing concealed handguns. This represents a gain of $6.2 billion ($4.2 billion from murder, $1.4 billion from aggravated assault, $374 million from rape, and $98 million from robbery), while the increase in property crimes represents a loss of $417 million ($343 million from auto theft, $73 million from larceny, and

$1.5 million from burglary). These numbers clearly show a net benefit to the welfare of society when concealed handgun laws are adopted. Of course, the actual value of the net benefit is dependant on the costs assigned to the various crimes. Lott believes that there are additional benefits not accounted for in the National Institute of Justice s study that would increase the actual net benefits of implementing nondiscretionary laws. Taking all of these numbers into account, it is difficult to oppose nondiscretionary concealed-handgun laws. For so long people have reflexively opposed these laws because increases in the number of guns in our society have always been associated with increased crime rates. John Lott s information, which has been supported by William Bartley, whose

extreme bound analysis has proved the validity of Lott s calculations, may be hard for some to accept. But information such as this must be headed if we expect to make progress in the field of crime prevention. References Bartley, William Alan & Cohen, Mark A. (1998). The effect of concealed weapons laws: an extreme bound analysis. Economic Inquiry, 36, 258-265. Justice Technology Information Network. NLECTC JustNet-What is NIJ? [Online] Available http://www.nlectc.org/who/who_nij.html, February 19, 1999. Lott, John R. More Guns, Less Crime. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Philipson, Tomas J. & Posner, Richard A. (1996). The economic epidemiology of crime. The Journal of Law and Economics, 39 (2), 405-434. Taubes, Gary (1992). Violence epidemiologists test the

hazards of gun ownership. Science, 258, 213-215.