The Bay Of Pigs Invasion Gone Wrong — страница 4

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training facilities, [blurred][blurred], Spanish-speakers, and similar essential ingredients of a successful operation. [Blurred] these been already in being, such time and effort would have been saved.” (Kirkpatrick, 143) The US government and the CIA did in fact take several actions that were mentioned in the Inspector General’s report. Such actions led to problems that caused the failure of the invasion. In the weeks before the actual invasion, the Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four picked up their pace in the preparations. On March 12th, 1961 the LCI “Barbara J” launched and recovered a sabotage team against the Texaco refinery in Santiago, Cuba. Beginning on March 13th, and ending on March 15th, the project chiefs worked on a revised plan that they presented to

the President on March 15th. (Higgins, 112) Although the planning was going along smoothly, it was taking to long for the Cuban exiles to wait, and several went AWOL. Although the mission was being prepared and almost ready, the Guatemala Camp was accepting trainees as late as the week of April 4th. These men were not able to complete the full training needed to go up against such a well organized defense as was Castro’s. In addition, during the invasion, certain military tactics did not work to the advantage of the invasion. Flights over Cuba were suspended on March 28th. The Government gave two reasons for the suspension. “(a) That the aircraft were needed to move the strike force from Guatemala to Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, for embarkation on the invasion ships; (b) that

the Agency wished to avoid any incident, such as a plane being downed over Cuba, which might upset the course of events during the critical pre-invasion period.” (Higgins, 132) Three Cuban airfields were raided by eight B-26s on April 15th, and resulted in destroying about half of Castro’s air force, which was estimated by post-strike photography. Attacks were not the only aspect of the invasion that was increasing. Propaganda efforts were increased. Before D-Day, Radio Swan, a propaganda offensive radio station, as well as other propaganda outlets were broadcasting eighteen hours a day on medium wave, and sixteen hours a day on short wave. The military tactics along with their mistakes continued. The invasion fleet which had assembled off the south coast of Cuba on the night

of 16 April included two LCIs owned by the Agency, a US Navy LSD carrying three LCUs and four LCVPs, all of them pre-loaded with supplies, and even charted commercial freighters. All these craft participated in the assault phase, except for three freighters which were loaded with follow-up supplies for ground and air-forces. These vessels were armed with 50-caliber machine guns. In addition, each LCI mounted two 75-mm. Recoilless rifles. (Higgins, 156) In addition to the personal weapons of the Cuban exile soldiers, the armament provided for combat included sufficient numbers of Browning automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and flame-throwers. There were also five M-41 tanks, 12 heavy trucks, an aviation fuel tank truck, a tractor crane, a

bulldozer, two large water trailers, and numerous small trucks and tractors. (Higgins, 156-157) A total of 1,511 men fought in the invasion, all of them were on the invasion ships, except for one airborne infantry company comprised of 177 men. The entire brigade included five infantry companies, one heavy weapons company, on intelligence-reconnaissance company, and one tank platoon. Although seemingly powerful and overwhelming, this invasion lacked the intelligence and the organization which was pointed out by the Inspector General. Its lack of adequate information on the strengths of the Castro regime and the incapability for the CIA to build up the resistance and guerrilla forces inside Cuba were two of the major reasons why the invasion went wrong. Even though there was an

adequate plan for invasion, the failure for resistance inside of Cuba made it impossible for the invaders to overpower Castro’s well trained army. The distraction of the guerrilla forces was needed for the invasion to work, however, as the failed the Bay of Pigs Invasion failed as well. The Inspector General Lymon Kirkpatrick was right when he said that the Central Intelligence Agency should have done more research on the Cubans’ weaknesses and strengths before invading, so that the Central Intelligence Agency Western Hemisphere Division Branch Four could have possibly defeated the Fidel Castro regime of the Republic of Cuba. The United States should have also done more to help relations with the United Soviet Socialist Republic. (Kirkpatrick) The CIA failure and