EU construction — страница 9

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states pledge so to alter their national laws and constitution as to prescribe that the head of their central bank be appointed for a term of five years, and that it only be possible  to dismiss him/her following legal examination by the European Court. The prerogative to initiate proceedings aimed at such a dismissal shall devolve solely on the ECB Council (i.e. directing boards and those chairing other countries´ central banks), or by the bank chair directly concerned, ´on grounds of infringement of this treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application´. So, it will not be possible, with an individual chairing a central bank, to call the mandate into question on the grounds that said individual lacks the confidence of his/ her principals.  

The ECB Council consists of the heads of fifteen central banks, the irremovability of whom is backed by the exclusive support of the European Court. To these 15 persons must be added the six members of the ECB´s directing board, who are appointed by the heads of state and government for a period of 8 years, and who cannot receive a renewed mandate. In a fashion comparable with that applying for the heads of the member states´ own central banks, moreover, it is prescribed that, if a member of the ECB´s directing board no longer meets the requirements for performing his/ her tasks, or if the member has been guilty of serious negligence, the European Court alone shall be able, upon the the request of the ECB Council, to dismiss that member.   Neither the

Commission, then, nor the Council of Ministers, nor the EP will be able to question the general judgement of the members of the Bank’s directing board, once its members have been appointed. The long mandate period is furthermore intended, as is the fact that members cannot be appointed to another term, to guarantee the independence of the ECB Council: The members thereof are not to the slightest trace of democratic accountability on any grounds other than those formulated by the financial experts themselves, with the juridical support they can obtain in court with the help of the Treaty provisions.   The idea, in other words, is that the 21 directors who are assigned the direction of the monetary policy of he EU are to create an institution of its own. Their joint

governance of monetary policy of the EU are to create an institution o fits own. Their joint governance of monetary policy is to be independent not merely in theory but also in practice. This independence is not just to obtain, moreover, in relation democracy in the member states. The lengthy mandate period, the ineligibility of the members for renewed service and the fact that said members can only be dismissed with the support of the European Court together entail a qualitative increase in the independence enjoyed by the directors of the Central Bank. It is not just the national democracies here which are removed from influence on account of the double asymmetry considered above. Above and beyond this the EU as such- irrespective altogether of the degree of democratic

accountability within each member state- forswears the possibility of weighting the value of a stable price level against other legitimate objectives.   The modification of the democratic principle for protecting the confidence in the value of a currency is acceptable because it takes account of special characteristic- inn the German legal system, tested and proven, in scientific terms as well- that an independent central bank is a better guarantor of currency and rely on short-term consent of political forces. To that extent the placing of monetary policy on an independent footing within the sovereign jurisdiction of a European Central Bank, which is not transferable to other political areas, satisfies the constitutional requirements where under the principle of democracy

may be modified.   In the authors´ view it cannot be shown that the Constitutional Court has succeeded in solving the problem of the democratic legitimacy of Community law and of the protected monetary union.    Ch.7  Legitimacy dilemmas of supranational governance. The EC between accountability and independence.   Normative foundations of European Integration.   First, European integration is of independent normative value above and beyond the benefits it provides to specific states, groups and individuals. Second, integration must be understood as an open-ended process rather than the emergence of a specific set of institutions and policies Third, European integration is not only the expression of, but also the response to, processes of