Creating Market Economy in Eastern Europe — страница 8

  • Просмотров 4180
  • Скачиваний 84
  • Размер файла 50

one-quarter that of the United States. Prior to the onset of major economic reform, the bulk of Polish industry was state-owned and planned. Agriculture (representing roughly one-fifth of total Polish output) was a mixed system wherein the private sector produced about three-quarters of the total agricultural product. Foreign trade turnover — that is, exports plus imports — represents roughly one-third of Polish product, again using U.S. dollar measures. 2) Poland: The Command Economy The organizational arrangements of the Polish command economy were estab­lished immediately after World War II and closely resembled those prevailing in the Soviet Union. There was widespread nationalization of property, central planning mechanisms were established, and agriculture was

socialized. In addi­tion to organizational arrangements, Polish economic policies of the era, such as those on investment, sectoral development, and the like, closely mirrored the Soviet model. Although Poland attempted modification of the command system as early as 1956 when collectivization was abandoned, little actually changed. Over time, private agriculture was neglected by the state, and continuing political protests, especially in the early 1970s, signaled both political and economic difficulties. The 1970s was a difficult decade for many countries, especially those that rely on imported oil. The Polish strategy in the 1970s and later was to stimulate the domestic economy through the importation of foreign technology. This was not an unreasonable strategy in theory,

but Western economies were themselves in the midst of the energy crisis and the recession it caused. Poland's effort to expand exports failed, hard-currency debt accumulated, and the projected impact of Western technology on the Polish economy was minimal. As the 1970s came to an end, it was evident that domestic retrenchment would be essential — a difficult path in light of the continuing unrest among Polish workers. The 1980s began with roughly three years of martial law and an attempt to achieve economic stabilization. After half-hearted economic reforms in the early 1980s, the rise of Solidarity (which had been outlawed in 1982) proved that major systemic and structural reform was necessary. Even so, and despite the fact that Polish economic performance was deteriorating

badly, serious economic reform did not begin until the late 1980s. 3) The Polish Transition: The "Big Bang" in Practice The Polish transition from plan to market has been watched closely by a variety of interested observers. Although many of the policy and systemic changes introduced in Poland are familiar hallmarks of the general reform scene, the speed of implementation in the Polish case is unique. There had been attempts to decentralize decision making in large state-owned Polish enterprises in the 1980s, but these reforms failed to change outcomes (a possible exception is their contribution to the wage explosion that took place toward the end of the decade). Moreover, on the eve of reform in Poland (the reform program began officially on January 1, 1990),

macroeco-nomic conditions there were in a state of severe disequilibrium. Although the exact nature of monetary overhang in Poland (as elsewhere) has been the sub­ject of debate, there was a significant budget deficit, wage increases were out of control, and hyperinflation had resulted. Poland's hard-currency debt posi­tion was better than that of Hungary, but the debt that had been accumulated did little to stimulate the Polish economy, the zioty was overvalued, and no debt relief from external sources was in sight. In the fall of 1989, most price controls were lifted (on both producer and consumer goods), public spending was reduced, and the zioty was devalued. In the second stage of major reform, begun in 1990, the budget deficit was sharply cut, largely through a

reduction of subsidies to state enterprises. A positive real rate of interest was to be implemented, and the market was to be used to signal changes in the value of the zloty. The latter was a critical measure, because foreign trade and the impact of this trade on the Polish industrial structure was to be a key component of the overall reform strategy. In January of 1990, the government set the exchange rate of the zloty at 9500 to the dollar (this repre­sented a devaluation from 1989), a rate roughly approximating its value on the black market, and it established convertibility of the zloty for international trade. Many trade restrictions were eliminated, and internal exchanges were set up to handle the buying and selling of hard currencies. Although these changes resulted