Creating Market Economy in Eastern Europe — страница 3

  • Просмотров 3340
  • Скачиваний 81
  • Размер файла 50

collect taxes from the private sector. Devising the rules for the new financial sector: Defining accounting rules for reporting business results to banks and investors; setting up a system of bank regulation. Determining ownership rights to existing real property: Devising laws relating to the transfer of property, and laws affecting landlord tenant relations; resolving the vexatious issue of restitution of property confiscated by communist governments. Foreign exchange: setting the rules under which private firms and individuals may esquire and sell foreign exchange and foreign goods; setting the rules in the same area for the not-yet-privatized enterprises. Next there are some tasks related to managing the: Reforming prices: Enterprises that have been privatized will presumably

be largely free to set their own prices, but early on in the process, the demands of the government budget will require raising prices on many consumer goods that have been provided at prices for below cost. 7. Creating a safety net: Setting up an emergency unemployment compensation scheme; targeting aid in kind or in cash to those threatened with severe hard ship by the reforms. Stabilizing the macroeconomic: Managing the government budget to avoid an excessive fiscal deficit and managing the total credit provided by the banking system. Finally there are tasks related to privatization: Small-scale privatization: Releasing to the private sector trucks and buses, retail shops, restaurants, repair shops, warehouses, and other building space for economic activities; establishing the

private right to purchase services from railroads, ports, and other enterprises which may remain in the public sector. Large-scale privatization: Transferring medium and large-scale enterprises to the private sector; managing the enterprises that have not yet been privatized. An abstract Model of the Transition consist of three main phases: Phase 1: The cabinet-level negative phase In this phase members of the central government interact with nationally representative interest groups. The tasks are organized into two categories: they will determine the general institutional structure of society and set guidelines that will be used in phase 2 to assign each enterprise to one of many alternative "transition regimes". Phase 2: The assigned phase In this phase state-owned

enterprises are matched with transition regimes. One can assume that each state-owned enterprise is completely described by some vector of attributes. These attributes specify such diverse aspects of the enterprise as: the nature of the products produced by the enterprise, a description of its plant and equipment, and technology it utilized; a description of its financial states; the place of the enterprise within its industry, including its market share and the nature of its competition; some indication of the risk profile of the firm; the distribution of information within the enterprise; the nature of "measurement errors" in monitoring the performance of the enterprise; the relationship between the enterprise and the state bureaucracy; the "distance"

between the enterprise and founding ministry; any potential synergies between the enterprise and some prospective foreign investor. Phase 3: The enterprise-level negotiation phase In this phase participants at the participants at the level of each enterprise play an MB game (multilateral bargaining). For each enterprise the structural parameters of the game are included in the characterization of the transition regime to which the enterprise is assigned. 2. The Emergence of Market Economy in European Countries. 2.1. The Transition to a Market Economy The Successes and Failures of Central Planning. Before considering the transition to a market economy, we must consider the need for such a transition. Today the need is clear: socialist and communist systems have failed to deliver

(in a liberal sense) anything like the standard of material advance so often promised. But more recent rasy assessments of central planning abound. Even as late as 1979 the World Bank published a long and detailed study of Romania – the most Stalinist of the eastern block. The Bank found that from 1950 to 1975 the Romanian economy had grown faster than any other country in the world (9,8 percent per annum). The Bank attributed this startling performance to the fact that government, through its system of central planning, had control of all resources. The Bank forecast a rasy future for Romania – growing at 8,7 percent per capita to 1990. Nor was Romania an aberration. The Bank published in that same year of 1979 a most rasy history of, and prognostication for Yugoslavia.