Bay Of Pigs 10 Pages Essay Research — страница 3

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condemn it to failure (Nelson, Craig 1). At midnight on April 16, the invasion began (Goode, Stephen 81). Things got off to a bad start. The coral reefs delayed several landing crafts and others experienced engine trouble. Some of the exiles chose a ground invasion. These troops penetrated about twenty miles into Cuba until they ran into Castro?s militia. The militia had heavy reinforcements which meant a quicker surrender for these exiles (Goode, Stephen 81). On Monday, April 17, the remaining planes of Castro?s air force were able to impose great damage on the ships and their invaders (Bay of Pigs Revisited, The 4). Two of the Liberation Army?s ships were sunk, The Houston and The Rio Candido, which sank with most of the Army?s ammunition, oil, communications equipment, and

men. Three of the B-26?s that the Liberation Army had were shot down by Cuba?s 20-mm cannons (Goode, Stephen 81). Later on that dreadful Monday, President Kennedy approved a second air strike, but it came too late. The exile force had been thoroughly defeated. When the planes arrived, they were an hour late because of the difference in time zones (Goode, Stephen 81 & 82). Of the 1,500 troops the army had at first, only 1,297 made it to Cuba. The others were killed at sea or deserted. After the Liberation Army surrendered, 1,180 of the 1,297 were captured and taken as prisoners to Havanna (Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali 95). Most of the captured exiles confessed their connection with the CIA and spoke of support from the United States (Goode, Stephen 82). Castro was

very angry with the United States and he told other nations the dangers that existed with the United States. Representatives spoke with Castro and came to a compromise. The United States wanted the prisoners back, and Castro needed medical supplies. They negotiated and Castro released the prisoners to return to Florida in time for Christmas, 1962 (Goode, Stephen 82). On April 19, one day after the failure of the invasion, Castro announced over the radio, ?The invaders have been annihilated. The Revolution has emerged victorious. It destroyed in less than seventy-two hours the army organized during many months by the imperialist government of the United States? (Goode, Stephen 82). Many people believed that Kennedy was the cause of the failure. CIA officials and Cuban exiles

believed Kennedy?s failure to approve air strikes to back up the seaborne invaders doomed the plan (Nelson, Craig 1). President Kennedy publicly shouldered the responsibility, but privately he blamed the CIA and his military advisers. He also said that the agency needed reorganization (Goode, Stephen 82). Although some CIA officials blamed the president, numerous others blamed the agency as well. The CIA director, Allen Dulles, resigned several months after the invasion. He was replaced by John McCone, a prominent businessman (Finkelstein, Norman H. 134). Many other CIA officials either quit or were fired by President Kennedy. Lyman Kirkpatrick, the CIA inspector general, wrote a report. He is said to be one of the harshest critiques of the invasion (Nelson, Craig 1). Kirkpatrick

laid most of the blame directly on the CIA. Allen Dulles, Richard Bissell, and others resented the report and said that he had betrayed the CIA (Goode, Stephen 83). The 150-page report was finally released after sitting in the CIA director?s safe for over thirty years. Some excerpts of the report were released on February 21, 1998 to the Associated Press. It said, ?The CIA?s ignorance, incompetence, as well as its arrogance toward the 1,400 Cuban exiles it trained and equipped to mount the invasion, was responsible for the fiasco. The choice was between retreat without honor and a gamble between ignominious defeat and dubious victory. The agency choose to gamble at rapidly decreasing odds, misinforming presidential officials, planning poorly, using faulty intelligence, and

conducting an overt military operation beyond their capability. The CIA project went forward under the pathetic illusion of deniability. Officials had failed to advise the president at an appropriate time, that success had become dubious and to recommend that the operation therefore be canceled? (Nelson,Craig 1). Other factors he criticized were the absence of adequate air cover, the problems in maintaining secrecy and security, press leaks, and the political infighting among the exiles who seemed more suspicious of one another than Castro (Goode, Stephen 84). In conclusion, did the government really believe that a force of 1,500 men were any match for Castro?s army of 400,000? Did they believe that their plan to attack was foolproof? Did they take time to plan the attack, or