Anarchy Essay Research Paper Anarchy is seen — страница 2

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general, in international politics, is troubled. Research on international regimes moved from attempts to describe the phenomena of interdependence and international regimes to closer analysis of the conditions under which countries cooperate. How does cooperation occur among sovereign states and how do international institutions affect it? Indeed, why should international institutions exist at all in a world dominated by sovereign states? This question seemed unanswerable if institutions were seen as opposed to or above, the state but not if they were viewed as devices to help states accomplish their objectives. The new school of thought argued that, rather than imposing themselves on states, international institutions should respond to the demand by states for cooperative ways

to fulfill their own purposes. By reducing uncertainty and the costs of making and enforcing agreements, international institutions help states achieve collective gains. This new institutionalism was not without its critics, who focused their attacks on two perceived shortcomings. The counterargument focused on the absence of a world government or effective international legal system to which victims of injustice can appeal. Second, theorists of cooperation had recognized that cooperation is not harmonious: it emerges out of discord and takes place through tough bargaining. Nevertheless, they claimed that the potential joint gains from such cooperation explained the dramatic increases in the number and scope of cooperative multilateral institutions. Critics pointed out, however,

that bargaining problems themselves could produce obstacles to achieving joint gains. Cooperation requires recognition of opportunities for the advancement of mutual interest, as well as policy coordination once these opportunities have been identified. Transaction and information costs are high. The complexity of international politics militates against identification and realization of common interest. Avoiding nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis called for cooperation by the Soviet Union and the United States. The transaction and information costs in the crisis, though substantial, did not preclude cooperation. By contrast, the problem of identifying significant actors, defining interests, and negotiating agreements that embodied mutual interests in the case of 1914

was far more difficult. There was no common procedure to handle the situation or resolve it in an efficient manner. In international politics, the likelihood of autonomous defection and of recognition and control problems increases. Cooperative behavior rests on calculations of expected utility - merging discount rates, payoff structures, and anticipated behavior of other players. Nations dwell in perpetual lawlessness, for no central authority with a defined law limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests. This common condition gives rise to diverse outcomes. War and concert, arms races and arms control, trade wars and tariff truces, financial panics and rescues, competitive devaluation and monetary stabilization mark relations among states. At times, the absences of

centralized international authority preclude attainment of common goals. Because, as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to a world government, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their commitments. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all well off. Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals though cooperation under lawlessness. Despite the absence of any ultimate international law, governments often bind themselves to mutually advantageous courses of action. And, though no international sovereign stands ready to enforce the terms of agreement, modern states can and do realize common interests through tacit cooperation, formal bilateral and multilateral negotiation, and the

creation if international regimes.