A Critical Evaluation Of Charles De Gaulle — страница 4
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generals.31 The troops remained loyal to the Government, and the attempted coup ground to a halt. Negotiations with the GPRA finally began at Evian in May 1961. De Gaulle was on the back foot, however, because of his repeated declarations to the French public to reach an agreement as soon as possible. As a result, the demand for a cease-fire before the start of negotiations had to be dropped, together with the demand to negotiate only with the FLN, and the demand that the Sahara would not be part of the new nation.32 The negotiations were slow, and continued on and off until 19 March 1962, when a settlement was finally reached. For the French, the most important parts of the settlement were the guarantees written into the accords protecting the European minority in an independent Algeria. De Gaulle presented the settlement to France for approval in April. The result in the referendum was overwhelming. 90 percent of the electorate voted to approve the accords.33 De Gaulle was successful in resolving the third greatest crisis for France in the twentieth century (the other two being the World Wars). He was successful because he chose to back his policies with popular support. Such support was needed for the passage of the constitution, which established the framework for dealing with Algeria; democratic reforms in Algeria itself indicated how greatly de Gaulle valued the democratic process; the referendum of January 1961 gave the President the mandate to seek a settlement that would go against the settlers and the army; and the popular support for the President among the conscripts saved the Fifth Republic in April 1961. There was also a degree of ‘realpolitik’ employed by de Gaulle in his actions – especially with the broadcast to the troops, the support of whom was entirely necessary. De Gaulle saved France from civil war and military dictatorship – therefore it is right to consider him as one of the finest statesmen of the twentieth century. FOOTNOTESEdgar O?Ballance, “The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962″, London, 1967, p.42. James F. McMillan, “Twentieth Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991″, London,1992, p.161. Herbert Tint, “French Foreign Policy since the Second World War”, London, 1972, p.192. ibid. O?Ballance, p.29. ibid., p.27. ibid., p.38. Robert Gildea, “France Since 1945″, Oxford, 1996, p.240. McMillan, p.162. O?Ballance, p.83. Andrew Shennan, “De Gaulle”, London, 1993, p.79. Charles Williams, “The Last Great Frenchman”, London, 1993, p.406. Tint, p.195. Gildea, p.45. Edward A. Kolodziej, “French International Policy Under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur”, London, 1974, p.447. ibid., p.448. Shennan, p.93. Kolodziej, p.457. Shennan, p.94. Kolodziej, p.457. Williams, p.397. O?Ballance, p.133. Williams, p.400. Kolodziej, p.458. Shennan, p.97. Williams, p.401. ibid., p.402. Kolodziej, p.460. ibid. ibid. Shennan, p.103. ibid. 33. Kolodziej, p.462.BIBLIOGRAPHYGildea, Robert, “France Since 1945″, Oxford, 1996. Kolodziej, Edward A., “French International Policy Under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur”, London, 1974. McMillan, James F., “Twentieth Century France: Politics and Society 1898-1991″, London,1992. O?Ballance, Edgar, “The Algerian Insurrection 1954-1962″, London, 1967. Shennan, Andrew, “De Gaulle”, London, 1993. Tint, Herbert, “French Foreign Policy since the Second World War”, London, 1972. Williams, Charles, “The Last Great Frenchman”, London, 1993.