A Country Report and Profile - Republic of Uzbekistan — страница 3

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favored gradual change, and the pace has become increasingly slower as the years have went on. Labor market and enterprise reform have been limited, and indeed the ultimate reason behind Uzbekistans slow price liberalization has been to maintain the value of real wages and subsidies. The government has promised to keep wage and benefit increases ahead of future price rises. 7Privatization in Uzbekistan has progressed extremely slow. Karimov dominates economic policy; he has issued a raft of decrees that are on occasion contradictory, but aim to convince the multilateral institutions that reform is taking place. The first form of privatization took place in 1994. The process lacked transparency, was corrupt and resulted in Mr Karimov=s allies owning the viable firms. Other

obstacles are that land liberalization ahead of establishing a guaranteed water supply would be meaningless for the irrigation-based agricultural sector. In industry, not only has privatization of state enterprises been slow but there was also very little privatization created from many small-scale entrepreneurs. 8II. Budgetary and Monetary Conditions Uzbekistan=s statistics are notoriously inaccurate and in small quantities. The government views economic data as a state secret, and circulation of the more informative data is restricted. All figures from Uzbekistan must be treated with a degree of caution as the government is trying show that the country is handling the post Soviet government better then its neighbors. The country is attempting to switch from the old communist

national accounting method using National material product (NMP), which excludes most services and depreciation, to the standard System of National Accounts (SNA). What is clear is that Uzbekistan=s economy has been in decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union. After a 3.7 % fall in 1991 National material product declined by 14.4% in 1992. GDP in those two years has dropped by 0.5% and 11.1%. In 1993 the fall in GDP was 2.4 % according to IMF estimates, with national material product down by 3.5% mainly due to continued government subsidies. The IMP initially estimated that, due to tighter policies, GDP contracted by 10.1% in 1994. However, the Uzbek authorities claim that despite a severe credit crunch and a confiscatory change of currency, GDP shrank by only 2.6%, the

figure that the IMF now accepts. 9Net Material Product 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total(Rb m) At current prices 21,588 23,402 49,636 386,071 3,686,800 Real Change ( %) 3.1 11.3 -3.7 -14.4 -3.5 Per Head (Rb) At current prices 1,091 1,157 2,407 18,287 170,622 Real change (%) 0.8 8.9 -5.5 -16.4 -5.7 *Derived from the World Bank mid-year population estimates. Budget Deficit Uzbekistan=s government budget has suffered from large deficits since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The IMF has put the 1993 fiscal deficit at 12% of GDP, while the governments figure released through the World Bank was 2.5%. The main reason for the deficits is lost revenue subsidies from the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan had one of the largest subsidy share of revenue compared to many of the other (CIS) countries.

During the 1980s the proportion of revenue actually increased form 20.8% in 1987 to 43.2% in 1990. Soviet grants which has once accounted for 7% of GDP in 1987 rose to 19.5% of GDP by 1991. 10III. Expenditure Policies and Assignments Although Uzbekistan is now engaged in the necessary fiscal and revenue-raising reforms demanded by multilateral institutions, very little revenue is received from taxes. Corruption, weak institutions, economic recession and poor tax compliance have hindered revenue collection severely. The government claims that actual revenue to GDP has risen in recent years from 26.4% to 41%in 1993. Given continued state control of the economy, tax compliance among state enterprises would tend to be greater than in countries with a growing private sector, although

figures may be overstated. On the expenditure side, increased outlays on defense and security, welfare payments, and subsidies to industry have been the most important developments since 1991. Increased expenditure was financed through huge expansion of domestic credit, montised by courtesy of the Russian Central Bank until 1993 when this tactical trend was eliminated once it was found to be unsustainable. The government then went to the IMF. The figures on the preceding page show this information 11State Budget (Rb bn) 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Revenue 9.7 11.8 15.1 30.2 139.8 1,814.5 of which: Turnover Tax 3.3 3.8 4.0 6.1 3.3 n/a VAT 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 38.4 477.1 Excises 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 44.9 Company income Tax 1.7 1.3 1.5 3.8 23.9 382.9 Personal Income tax 1.1 1.5 1.3 1.8